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This year’s Survey period saw a number of attacks to the state’s various
taxing regimes—brought not only by taxpayers but also by taxing
authorities—and seemed to preview battles that would play out during
the 85th legislative session in 2017.1 However, following a sustained
period of low commodity prices, the legislature had to scramble to find
the dollars to cover various priorities in 2017 and spent much of the
legislative session debating social issues, such as bathroom etiquette. As
predicted by many tax practitioners and other political and legislative
insiders, sweeping tax reforms did not materialize during the 85th
legislative session. As a result, Texas courts’ continuing focus on statutory
construction, and their struggles to balance their own readings of the
legislature’s words against the comptroller’s interpretations, are likely to
take on increased significance in the short term and possibly for years to
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As is often the case, this Survey period saw several cases requiring
courts to construe statutory language and to weigh their construction
against alternate comptroller interpretations. Following past decisions
that focused on the plain language of statutes, courts continued during
the Survey period to divine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning
of statutes, yielding results that caused taxpayers to both celebrate and
lament the courts’ efforts.3
In the long-awaited Southwest Royalties, Inc. v. Hegar,4 the Texas Su-
preme Court considered whether equipment used in the extraction of oil
and gas from underground reservoirs qualified for the manufacturing ex-
emption in Section 151.318 of the Texas Tax Code.5 In so doing, the su-
preme court affirmed the findings of both the trial court and the Austin
Court of Appeals that physical changes to hydrocarbons brought to the
surface during extraction only indirectly resulted from equipment used by
Southwest.6 The supreme court held that because such equipment did not
itself alter the nature of the minerals, it did not qualify as “manufactur-
ing, processing, or fabricating” equipment within the meaning of the stat-
ute, and therefore did not qualify for exemption from sales and use tax.7
Southwest Royalties had claimed exemptions for its casing, tubing,
pumps, and related parts used to extract oil and natural gas from the
ground, asserting that the equipment met the requirements of three man-
ufacturing exemption provisions: a general manufacturing exemption,8 a
2. This Survey period covers selected developments from February 2016 to
November 2016. Rather than describing every case and rule change during the period, this
article comments on those developments most likely to change significantly the legal
landscape or reflect an important trend.
3. One case offering a mixed bag for taxpayers during the Survey period was Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hegar, 484 S.W.3d 611 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. denied). Due to the
timing of last year’s publication, this decision, which involved temporary employment ser-
vices, was reported in that Survey. See Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 2 SMU ANN.
TEX. SURV. 479, 480–82 (2016).
4. 500 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. 2016).
5. See id. at 402.
6. See id. at 402–03.
7. Id. at 409.
8. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(a)(2) (West 2015). This general manufactur-
ing provision exempts:
[T]angible personal property directly used or consumed in or during the ac-
tual manufacturing, processing, or fabrication of tangible personal property
for ultimate sale if the use or consumption of the property is necessary or
essential to the manufacturing, processing, or fabrication operation and di-
rectly makes or causes a chemical or physical change to:
(A) the product being manufactured, processed, or fabricated for ultimate
sale; or
(B) any intermediate or preliminary product that will become an ingredi-
ent or component part of the product being manufactured, processed
or fabricated for ultimate sale . . . .
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pollution control exemption,9 and a public health exemption.10 All three
exemptions require that the equipment for which the exemption is sought
be used or consumed in “the actual manufacturing, processing, or
fabrication of tangible personal property.”11
In addressing the statutory language, the court of appeals noted that
the text was unclear as to whether oil and gas extraction is included in
“manufacturing, processing, or fabrication.”12 On that basis, the court of
appeals deferred to the comptroller’s interpretation, found the equipment
failed to qualify for exemption, and upheld the trial court’s judgment in
favor of the comptroller.13
Focusing on the ordinary meaning of the term “processing,” the su-
preme court concluded that “processing” in the manufacturing exemption
is not ambiguous, and also concluded that the comptroller’s interpreta-
tion of the term in Rule 3.300(a)(10) of the Texas Administrative Code is
consistent with its ordinary meaning.14 The supreme court therefore
adopted the definition of “processing” in Rule 3.300(a)(10): “[t]he physi-
cal application of the materials and labor necessary to modify or change
the characteristics of tangible personal property.”15
The supreme court then looked to the facts developed in the trial court
to determine whether the equipment Southwest used to extract oil fell
within the scope of the exemption. The supreme court resisted the exten-
sive briefing by both the parties and amici debating whether oil and gas
production constitutes “processing” and focused instead on “whether the
equipment for which Southwest is seeking an exemption was used in the
actual physical application of materials and labor to the hydrocarbons
that was necessary to cause, and caused, a physical change to them.”16
Finding that changes to the hydrocarbons were caused by changes in
pressure and temperature as the hydrocarbons were brought to the sur-
face—and not, as the taxpayer had urged, by the equipment at issue—the
supreme court held that the equipment was not manufacturing equipment
within the meaning of Section 151.318 and therefore did not qualify for
9. See id. § 151.318(a)(5). The pollution control exemption exempts “tangible per-
sonal property used or consumed in the actual manufacturing, processing, or fabrication of
tangible personal property for ultimate sale if the use or consumption of the property is
necessary and essential to a pollution control process.”
10. See id. § 151.318(a)(10). The public health exemption exempts “tangible personal
property used or consumed in the actual manufacturing, processing, or fabrication of tangi-
ble personal property for ultimate sale if the use or consumption of the property is neces-
sary and essential to comply with federal, state, or local laws or rules that establish
requirements related to public health.”
11. Sw. Royalties, 500 S.W.3d at 402 (quoting TAX § 151.318(a)(2), (5), (10)).
12. Sw. Royalties, Inc. v. Combs, 501 S.W.3d 95, 101 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014) (mem.
op.), aff’d sub nom., Sw. Royalties, Inc. v. Hegar, 500 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. 2016).
13. Id. at 104. For a discussion of the court of appeals’ opinion, see Ohlenforst et al.,
supra note 3, at 482–83.
14. Sw. Royalties, 500 S.W.3d at 405–07 (citing 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.300(a)(10)
(2017) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Manufacturing; Custom Manufacturing;
Fabricating; Processing)).
15. Id. at 406 (quoting ADMIN. § 3.300(a)(10)).
16. Id. at 407.
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exemption under any of the three prongs on which Southwest Royalties
had relied.17 Whether a future court might make the subsequent inferen-
tial leap to conclude that extraction is therefore not processing within the
meaning of the statute remains to be seen.18 It also remains unclear the
extent, if any, to which the supreme court was influenced by the comp-
troller’s assertions that a taxpayer-favorable decision in this case would
have dire financial consequences to the state fisc.19
Likewise, in Hegar v. CheckFree Services Corp.,20 the Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals looked both to the Tax Code and to the comp-
troller’s interpretation in rules to decide whether an online banking com-
pany’s offerings fell within the purview of the term “data processing
services.”21 CheckFree contracted with banks to provide electronic bill-
pay services to bank customers.22 The comptroller argued that, because
bank customers enter data into CheckFree’s system in order to effectuate
the payment of bills, CheckFree provides a taxable data processing ser-
vice. The trial court, however, disagreed, and the court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court’s judgment.23
In part because CheckFree, through its thousands of skilled and certi-
fied employees, was providing professional bill-pay services and using
computers only incidentally to facilitate those services, the court of ap-
peals found that such services did not constitute taxable data processing
services.24 Interpreting the definitions of “data processing” in Section
151.0035 of the Texas Tax Code and in Rule 3.330 of the Texas Adminis-
trative Code, and looking to the “essence of the transaction,” the court of
appeals held that “CheckFree’s services do not fall within the Comptrol-
ler’s definition of data processing services because that definition specifi-
cally excludes providers of other professional services who use a
computer to facilitate the performance of their services.”25 Importantly,
17. See id. at 407–09.
18. However, the supreme court did note that the comptroller had previously inter-
preted the term “processing” not to include mere oil extraction in Comptroller Hearing
No. 31,253 (1998). Id. at 408 (“[T]he act of bringing oil to the surface of the earth is not
processing. . . . [On the other hand,] injecting carbon dioxide for the purpose of thinning or
increasing the gravity of the oil creates a physical change in the oil and is, therefore, a
processing activity.”).
19. See, e.g., Ohlenforst et al., supra note 3, at 494–95. In any event, the comptroller
continued to make such assertions in its briefing in at least one other case. See infra note 46
and accompanying text regarding Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Hegar, No. 03-14-00397-CV,
2017 WL 74416 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 6, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
20. No. 14-15-00027-CV, 2016 WL 1576414 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 19,
2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
21. See id. at *1.
22. Id. at *3.
23. Id. at *1, *6.
24. Id. at *5–6.
25. Id. at *2–4, *6 (citing 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330(a)(1) (2017) (Comptroller of
Pub. Accounts, Manufacturing; Custom Manufacturing; Fabricating; Processing); TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. §§ 151.0101(b), 151.0035 (West 2015)). The court also noted that “[a]lthough
the Comptroller has been granted exclusive jurisdiction to interpret what ‘taxable services,’
including ‘data processing services,’ means, the Comptroller may not interpret this term in
a manner contrary to the tax code.” Id. at *2 (internal footnote omitted) (citing TAX
2017] Taxation 449
the comptroller’s own rule, Rule 3.330, provides that “[d]ata processing
does not include the use of a computer by a provider of other services
when the computer is used to facilitate the performance of the service or
application of the knowledge of the physical sciences, accounting princi-
ples, and tax laws.”26 The court of appeals emphasized that “the trial
court’s findings and conclusions properly focused on the ‘essence of the
transaction’ at issue, rather than simply the involvement of a computer, to
determine the nature of the services CheckFree provided.”27 In 1987,
when the legislature first made data processing services taxable, both leg-
islators and the comptroller recognized that not all services involving
computerized data would be taxable data processing. With the subse-
quent expansion of computers into virtually every aspect of life, the lines
between taxable data processing and nontaxable services sometimes seem
blurred (especially in the context of a tax audit). Thus, the CheckFree
Services analysis is particularly important for its recognition of the funda-
mental reality that current business enterprises that rely on computers,
software, and related services are not necessarily using a taxable service.
The courts continue to wrestle with the sale for resale exemption. In a
case reminiscent of DTWC Corp. v. Combs,28 the Austin Court of Ap-
peals in Fitness International, LLC v. Hegar29 addressed whether gym
equipment, including cardio and abdominal machines and weight racks,
qualifies for the sale for resale exemption when customers, through a gym
§ 151.0101(b); Combs v. Home & Garden Party, Ltd., No. 03-09-00673-CV, 2010 WL
4367054, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 3, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.)).
26. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330(a)(1).
27. CheckFree Servs., 2016 WL 1576414, at *4. Also addressing computer-related is-
sues, the district court in Calavista, L.P. v. Hegar determined that Calavista was entitled to
a refund for third-party software modifications and custom software development services.
See Final Judgment, Calavista, L.P. v. Hegar, No. D-1-GN-15-001662 (126th Dist. Ct.,
Travis County, Tex. Apr. 14, 2016); Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 11,
Calavista, L.P. v. Hegar, No. D-1-GN-15-001662 (126th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Mar.
22, 2016). The case addressed both substantive and procedural issues. Calavista relied on
Section 151.0101(a)(5)(D) of the Texas Tax Code, which explicitly excludes from taxable
services “the repair, maintenance, creation, and restoration of a computer program, includ-
ing its development and modification, not sold by the person performing the repair, main-
tenance, creation, or restoration service.” See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
supra, at 6–7 (quoting TAX § 151.0101(a)(5)(D)). The comptroller ultimately agreed with
Calavista on the merits, but filed a plea to the jurisdiction (a frequently-used tool in the
attorney general’s toolbox), asserting that because it had agreed to issue Calavista the re-
fund it sought, the case had become moot. In its response to the plea, Calavista complained
that it was entitled to a judicial decision, in part so it would not be at risk to yet another
comptroller assessment on the very same issues, and pointed out that it had asked for a
refund, not the promise of a refund. One day after Calavista filed its response to the plea,
the trial court agreed that Calavista deserved certainty and issued its Final Judgment. See
Final Judgment, supra (granting Calavista’s motion for summary judgment and ordering
the comptroller to refund $196,902.38 in tax, penalty, and interest, plus statutory interest
and court costs).
28. 400 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.).
29. No. 03-15-00534-CV, 2016 WL 3391606 (Tex. App.—Austin Jun. 16, 2016, pet. de-
nied) (mem. op.).
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membership, are allowed to use the equipment.30 Fitness International
argued that the equipment was effectively resold or rented to those mem-
bers. Looking to Fitness International’s operations and agreements with
its members, the court of appeals was unpersuaded.31 The court inter-
preted the terms “resell” and “transfer” in the resale exemption accord-
ing to their common meanings, both of which—according to the court—
required elements of possession and control.32 Because Fitness Interna-
tional had “superior legal possession of the items and merely provide[d]
access to and use of its facilities—including whatever exercise equipment
may or may not be on site and functioning at any given time—under
terms and conditions completely within its own discretion for a specified
monthly fee,” the equipment at issue was not resold or leased and thus
did not fall within the sale for resale exemption.33
B. COMPTROLLER RULES34
During the Survey period, the comptroller continued efforts to update
rules, including by bringing rules into accord with current legislation,
sometimes after years without an amending update.35 Many of the rule
amendments during the period, therefore, related to legislative changes
from the 2015 legislative session and, in some cases, earlier legislative
sessions.
Included in the list of rules the comptroller modified in response to
legislative action are Rules 3.286 (involving nexus and taxpayers’ respon-
sibilities) and 3.355 (involving insurance services) of the Texas Adminis-
trative Code.36 Amendments to Rule 3.355 implement the 84th
Legislature’s House Bill 1841, which excluded public insurance adjuster
services from taxable insurance services.37 The amendments to Rule
3.286, among other things, implement Section 151.0241 of the Texas Tax
30. See id. at *1–2. The trial court determined that towels, basketballs, and consum-
ables, such as body wash and shampoo, were exempt, but determined the equipment at
issue on appeal did not qualify for the resale exemption. Id. at *2.
31. Id. at *3.
32. Id. (citing McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003)).
33. Id.
34. Citations to agency materials are to the most recently amended Texas
Administrative Code as of the time this article went to press, but readers should note that
the rules originally appeared during the 2016 Survey period in the Texas Register.
35. Comptroller staff acknowledged that additional changes to some rules might be
needed to address other issues, but noted that bringing rules up-to-date with statutory
changes should not be further delayed as would be required by waiting to make all contem-
plated changes.
36. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.286 (2017) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Seller’s
and Purchaser’s Responsibilities including Nexus Permits, Returns and Reporting Periods,
and Collection and Exemption Rules); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.355 (2017) (Comptroller
of Pub. Accounts, Insurance Services). The comptroller also amended Rule 3.320 (concern-
ing the Texas emissions reduction plan surcharge) to reduce the surcharge rate from 2% to
1.5%, consistent with the legislative change in the 84th Legislature’s House Bill 7. See 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.320 (2017) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Texas Emissions Re-
duction Plan Surcharge; Off-Road, Heavy-Duty Diesel Equipment); Act of June 15, 2015,
84th Leg., R.S., ch. 448 (H.B. 7), § 35, sec. 151.0515(b), 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 1740, 1755.
37. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.355.
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Code, which was enacted in 2015 to provide that out-of-state entities en-
tering Texas to perform certain disaster- and emergency-related work will
not be deemed to have established nexus in Texas as a result of such
activities.38 The amendments to Rule 3.286 also memorialize a comptrol-
ler presumption that an out-of-state seller that does not identify tax on an
invoice or contract as Texas sales or use tax did not collect Texas sales or
use tax.39 This presumption may help some taxpayers avoid an assess-
ment for tax collected but not remitted, but it is also likely to make it
more difficult for out-of-state taxpayers to demonstrate to the comptrol-
ler’s satisfaction that Texas tax was properly collected and remitted.
Also in response to legislation, the comptroller adopted new Rule
3.353 of the Texas Administrative Code and amendments to Rule 3.369 of
the Texas Administrative Code, both of which concern sales tax holi-
days.40 New Rule 3.353 implements Section 151.3565 of the Texas Tax
Code (which created a sales tax holiday for certain emergency prepara-
tion supplies),41 and the amendments to Rule 3.369 implement Section
151.3335 of the Texas Tax Code (which created a sales tax holiday for
certain water-efficient products).42 Both rules include provisions that pro-
vide detailed guidance on items qualifying for exemption and the tax
treatment of layaways, discounts, exchanges, delivery and installation
charges, and pre-packaged bundles of taxable and exempt items.43 Al-
though the portions of the rules mirroring the statutory language often
track that language fairly closely, there are some discrepancies. For in-
stance, the definition of “water-conserving product” in Section 151.3335
includes two provisions—one for certain tangible personal property used
on residential property and another that provides a list of items qualifying
for exemption, including certain hoses, irrigation systems, and mulch.44
The definition of “water-conserving product” in Rule 3.369, however, de-
scribes the latter list of items as examples of the types of items described
in the former provision, thereby apparently taking the position that items
such as hoses, irrigation systems, and mulch should be subject to the resi-
dential use requirement and other requirements listed in the first statu-
tory provision.45
38. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.286(a)(3), (d)(2)(B); see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.0241 (West Supp. 2016).
39. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.286(d)(2)(B).
40. See 34 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 3.353 (2017) (Comptroller of Pub. Account, Sales Tax
Holiday—Certain Emergency Preparation Supplies); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.369 (2017)
(Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Sales Tax Holiday—Certain Energy Star Products, Certain
Water-Conserving Products, and WaterSense Products).
41. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.353; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3565
(West 2015).
42. See 41 Tex. Reg. 3789, 3870 (2016) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.369); see
also TAX § 151.3335.
43. See generally 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 30353, 3.369.
44. TAX § 151.3335(a)(1).
45. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.369(a)(7); see also 41 Tex. Reg. 3789, 3870 (codified
at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.369 (2016) (preamble) (“New paragraph (7) defines the term
‘water-conserving product’ and includes examples of water-conserving products.”).
452 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 3
II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. REPORTED CASES
The Survey period saw several favorable outcomes for taxpayers chal-
lenging various aspects of the Texas franchise tax and its application to
their businesses. The Texas Supreme Court continued to look to statutory
language to resolve disputes, and the Austin Court of Appeals continued
its trend of recognizing that cost of goods sold (COGS) is not as narrow
as the comptroller sometimes argues, including in the context of certain
real property construction services.46
In Hallmark Marketing Co., LLC v. Hegar,47 the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the meaning of “net gain from the sale” used to determine
gross receipts from a taxpayer’s entire business for purposes of appor-
tionment under Section 171.105(b) of the Texas Tax Code.48 Hallmark
had incurred substantial losses on sales of investments and capital assets,
such that its losses on such sales during the tax year at issue were greater
than its gains.49 Section 171.105(b) provides that “[i]f a taxable entity sells
an investment or capital asset, the taxable entity’s gross receipts from its
entire business for taxable margin includes only the net gain from the
sale.”50 Hallmark argued that its net loss did not constitute a “net gain”
within the meaning of the statutory language, and therefore it was not
required to include the net loss in its apportionment formula.51 However,
the comptroller’s interpretation of this section, in Rule 3.591 of the Texas
Administrative Code, provides that, “[i]f the combination of net gains
46. Despite these mostly taxpayer-friendly decisions, some taxpayers were left holding
their breath during the Survey period. Several significant cases remained pending through-
out the entire Survey period. Two such cases were Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Hegar, 471
S.W.3d 138 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, pet. granted), and American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v.
Hegar, No. 03-14-00397-CV, 2017 WL 74416, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 6, 2017, no
pet.) (mem. op.). At issue in Graphic Packaging was a taxpayer’s claim that it was entitled
to use the three-factor formula from the Multistate Tax Compact for purposes of appor-
tioning its Texas franchise tax. See Graphic Packaging, 471 S.W.3d at 139. American Multi-
Cinema involved a movie theater’s qualification to rely on the COGS calculation. After the
Survey period, the Austin Court of Appeals withdrew its initial opinion, American Multi-
Cinema, Inc. v. Hegar, No. 03-14-00397-CV, 2015 WL 1967877 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 30,
2015), opinion withdrawn and superseded on overruling of reh’g sub nom., 2017 WL 74416
(Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 6, 2017, pet. granted), and issued a new decision, again holding for
the taxpayer but instead relying on a different, industry-specific definition of tangible per-
sonal property that includes films, sound recordings, books, television and radio programs,
and similar property. See Am. Multi-Cinema, 2017 WL 74416, at *1–2 (citing TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 171.1012(a) (West 2015)). Next year’s Survey should include a more com-
plete discussion of the new decision, but it is important to note in this article that the court
of appeals decision upheld the taxpayer’s right to claim COGS but left unclear the extent
to which its holding would apply to taxpayers outside the industry-specific statutory provi-
sions. The comptroller asserted, as it did in Southwest Royalties, that a taxpayer-favorable
decision could trigger refund claims that could adversely impact the state’s budget. Query
the extent to which it is appropriate for a court to even consider the comptroller’s budget-
ary arguments in a case of statutory interpretation.
47. 488 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. 2016).
48. Id. at 796–97.
49. Id. at 799.
50. TAX § 171.105(b).
51. Hallmark Mktg. Co., 488 S.W.3d at 797.
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and losses results in a net loss, the taxable entity should net the loss
against other receipts, but not below zero.”52
Relying on Calvert v. Electro-Science Investors, Inc.,53 which construed
a former statutory section similar to Section 171.105(b) to require that
gains and losses be offset in order to arrive at a net figure, the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals concluded that Section 171.105(b) is ambigu-
ous.54 The court of appeals concluded that Rule 3.591 is reasonable and
therefore entitled to deference.55 Therefore, Hallmark was required to
include its net loss in its apportionment factor.56
The supreme court, however, identified the statutory ambiguity issue as
a red herring. Without revisiting the issue in Electro-Science Investors,
and pointing to the parties’ agreement that Hallmark had incurred a net
loss, the supreme court focused on what was clear from the statutory
language:
However net gain is calculated, a statutory net gain cannot simulta-
neously be a net loss. Accountants might dispute how to properly
offset losses against gains and whether the correct calculation should
result in a positive or negative figure, but none can dispute that if
that end result is a positive number, it’s a net gain, and if it’s a nega-
tive number, it’s a net loss.57
The supreme court concluded that the comptroller’s interpretation of
“net gain” to include a net loss constituted an unreasonable rewriting of
the statute, and Hallmark was not required to include its net loss in its
apportionment calculations.58 The supreme court did not, however, spec-
ify whether, or how, losses should offset gains to calculate a “net gain”
under the apportionment statutes.59
In Hegar v. CGG Veritas Services (U.S.), Inc.,60 the Austin Court of
Appeals addressed the meaning of the term “labor and materials” for
purposes of the franchise tax COGS calculation.61 CGG performed ge-
oseismic work for companies engaged in oil and gas exploration. Relying
on Section 171.1012(i) of the Texas Tax Code, which permits an entity to
use the COGS calculation if it is “furnishing labor or materials to a pro-
ject for the construction, improvement, remodeling, repair, or industrial
52. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.591(e)(2) (2017) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Mar-
gin: Apportionment).
53. 509 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1974, no writ).
54. See Hallmark Mktg. Co., LLC v. Combs, No. 13-14-00093-CV, 2014 WL 6090574,
at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Nov. 13, 2014) (mem. op.), rev’d sub nom. Hallmark
Mktg. Co., LLC v. Hegar, 488 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. 2016).
55. Id. at *4.
56. Id. at *4–5. For a discussion of the court of appeals’ decision, see Ohlenforst et al.,
supra note 3, at 492–93.
57. Hallmark Mktg. Co., LLC v. Hegar, 488 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. 2016) (internal cita-
tion omitted).
58. Id. at 796.
59. Id. at 797.
60. No. 03-14-00713-CV, 2016 WL 1039054 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 9, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
61. See id. at *3.
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maintenance [ ] of real property,” CGG argued that its work qualified for
the COGS calculation.62 The comptroller, however, argued that such
work was a service that could not qualify for the COGS calculation.63
In deciding the case, the court of appeals looked to its own recent pre-
cedent exploring the meaning of “labor.”64 In Combs v. Newpark Re-
sources, Inc., the court of appeals properly concluded that the legislature
“intended section 171.1012 to permit taxable entities to deduct a wide
range of labor expenses, including those associated with activities that
might also be described as a ‘service.’”65 Relying on the standard it estab-
lished in Newpark for determining eligibility for the COGS calculation—
“whether the particular activity is an essential and direct component of
the ‘project for the construction . . . of real property’”—the court of ap-
peals concluded that CGG’s activities qualified for the COGS calcula-
tion.66 In reaching this conclusion, the court appears to have assigned
some weight to the comptroller’s agreement that an oil and gas well con-
stitutes real property and the trial court’s finding that CGG’s services
were “an integral, essential, and direct component of the oil and gas drill-
ing process.”67
B. COMPTROLLER RULES
Compared to sales tax rules, the comptroller proposed and adopted
fewer franchise tax rules during the Survey period. Some amendments
were meant as clarifications or to implement enacted legislation, and
other changes codified comptroller policy.
The comptroller adopted amendments to Rule 3.582 of the Texas Ad-
62. Id. at *2 (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(i) (West 2015)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Combs v. Newpark Res., Inc., 422 S.W.3d 46, 56 (Tex. App.—Austin
2013, no pet.)).
66. Id. at *3, *5 (citing Newpark Res., 422 S.W.3d at 56).
67. See id. at *4. On June 30, 2016, following the Austin Court of Appeals’ decision in
Titan Transportation, LP v. Combs, the comptroller’s Tax Policy Division issued a memo-
randum interpreting Section 171.1012(i) and effecting two policy changes following the
appellate court’s decision. See Titan Transp., L.P. v. Combs, 433 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2014, pet. denied); TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, TAX POLICY DIV.,
STAR DOC. NO. 201606856L, POLICY CHANGE BASED ON Titan and Newpark (June 30,
2016), https://star.cpa.texas.gov/view/201606856L [https://perma.cc/J3XA-MK25]. The
memorandum discusses the decisions in both Titan Transportation (addressing Section
171.1011(g) of the Texas Tax Code) and Newpark Resources (addressing Section
171.1012(i)), and it revises comptroller policies in response to those decisions. According
to the memorandum, both Tax Code sections allow taxpayers in certain industries to claim
either the COGS calculation or an exclusion from revenue for flow-through funds, but
Section 171.1011(g) may have broader application because it includes payments related to
“proposed” projects. Therefore, according to the memorandum, costs for architects and
engineers, whether or not construction actually begins on a project, may qualify for the
flow-through funds exclusion but may not qualify for the COGS calculation. The memo-
randum also states that costs “considered too far removed” from actual construction or
improvement, including legal and accounting services, do not qualify for an exclusion or
the COGS calculation. For a discussion of Titan Transportation, see Ohlenforst et al., supra
note 3, at 491–92. For a discussion of Newpark Resources, see Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al.,
Taxation, 1 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 101, 108–10 (2014) [hereinafter Taxation I].
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ministrative Code related to filing requirements for passive entities.68
Compared to the text of the rule prior to these changes, some of the
amendments appear to impose additional filing requirements on some
passive entities. For instance, a passive entity that is registered with the
Secretary of State or the comptroller must now file a No Tax Due Report
for each period that it qualifies as a passive entity.69 Prior comptroller
policy had required a passive entity to file an information report only for
the first period that it qualified as a passive entity and did not require
subsequent reports.70 Also, new subsection (c)(3) provides that “[a]n en-
tity with no federal gross income does not qualify as a passive entity.”71
Passive entities that go dormant or otherwise do not have gross income
for a period should review this rule carefully to determine their filing
responsibilities, and consider whether the rule is consistent with the statu-
tory requirements imposed on passive entities.
The comptroller also amended Rule 3.588 of the Texas Administrative
Code72 related to the COGS calculation to track more closely Section
171.1012 of the Texas Tax Code.73 The prior version of the rule defined
“goods” to include “the husbandry of animals; the growing and harvest-
ing of crops; [and] the severance of timber from realty.”74 The amend-
ments move this definition of “goods” to a subsection addressing costs
related to undocumented workers, consistent with the statute.75 It is not
clear whether taxpayers can or should rely on the prior version to claim
COGS for report years during which the prior version was effective.
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. REPORTED CASES
This Survey period highlighted mounting frustration with the Texas
property tax system, not only among taxpayers, but also among taxing
authorities. In addition to the typical property tax cases involving valua-
tion and collection disputes between a property owner and an appraisal
district or taxing unit, several taxing unit actions during this Survey pe-
riod called the state’s property tax system into question. For instance,
Houston Independent School District (ISD) elected not to participate in
the state’s school finance recapture program. Some speculated that the
likely outcome of this decision would be that property located in Houston
ISD would be detached and assigned to another independent school dis-
68. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.582 (2017) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin:
Passive Entities).
69. See id. § 3.582(g)(1).
70. See Former Rule 3.582(g)(1), 34 Tex. Reg. 9265, 9464–65 (2009), amended by 41
Tex. Reg. 3205, 3241 (2016), adopted by 41 Tex. Reg. 4529, 4649 (2016).
71. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.582(c)(3).
72. Id. § 3.588 (2017) (Comptroller of Public Accounts, Margin: Cost of Goods Sold).
73. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012 (West 2015).
74. Former Rule 3.588(b)(3), 38 Tex. Reg. 3397, 3415–20 (2013), amended by 41 Tex.
Reg. 3563, 3625–29 (2016), adopted by 41 Tex. Reg. 4911, 5073 (2016).
75. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.588(g)(14).
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trict but so far this has not occurred. Instead, voters authorized the dis-
trict to fulfill its recapture obligation after the Texas Education Agency
redued that obligation.76
City of Austin v. Travis Central Appraisal District77 involved a frontal
assault on the property tax system by an aggrieved taxing unit. In that
case, the City of Austin (the City) alleged that Sections 41.43(b)(3) and
42.26(a)(3) of the Texas Tax Code—both of which involve challenges to
unequal appraisals78—were invalid because they encouraged taxpayer
protests that led the appraisal review board to lower property values.
These protests, the City argued, artificially depressed the median prop-
erty value below market value. Thus, those property owners who were
appraised at market value were taxed unequally relative to those who
contested their taxes and successfully achieved a reduction toward the
median value, presenting a problem of unequal taxation under the Texas
Constitution.79 Junk Yard Dogs, a property owner involved in the suit,
argued that the City lacked standing because it failed to allege a particu-
larized injury specific to itself, and that the City failed to exhaust its ad-
ministrative remedies.80
The Austin Court of Appeals agreed with Junk Yard Dogs, concluding
that the City’s allegations faltered in both respects.81 Fatal to the City’s
claims was its acknowledgment that it did not bring suit to raise tax reve-
nue, but rather to “ensure equal and uniform taxation to all Austin re-
sidents.”82 While the court of appeals noted that some statutes empower
governmental entities to bring constitutional challenges if they have been
76. See Shelby Webb, HISD Voters Flip on Subsidy, HOUS. CHRON., May 6, 2017,
http://chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/HISD-voters-flip-on-susidy-
11127234.php [https://perma.cc/6555-S3H8]. Several cases reported in past surveys re-
mained stalled in the appellate courts during this Survey period. Those cases involve the
property tax treatment of heavy equipment, Harris County Appraisal District v. ETC Mar-
keting, Ltd., 476 S.W.3d 501, 503–04 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, aff’d, 518
S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2017)), and Galveston Central Appraisal District v. Valero Refining-Texas
L.P., 463 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015), rev’d, 519 S.W.3d 66 (Tex.
2017). For a general discussion of the heavy equipment case, see Ohlenforst et al., supra
note 3, at 500–02. For a discussion of ETC Marketing, see Ohlenforst et al., supra note 3, at
503–04. For a discussion of Valero Refining, see Ohlenforst et al., supra note 3, at 502–03.
After the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court issued decisions in the Valero Refining
and ETC Marketing cases. In ETC Marketing, the supreme court affirmed the First Hous-
ton Court of Appeals’ decision, which found natural gas stored in Texas subject to property
tax. See ETC Marketing, Ltd. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 518 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex.
2017). In Valero Refining, the supreme court reversed the Fourteenth Houston Court of
Appeals’ decision and concluded that Valero was permitted, as a matter of law, to chal-
lenge the appraised values of only a portion of its refinery in an unequal appraisal case. See
Valero Ref.-Tex., L.P. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 519 S.W.3d 66, 68 (Tex. 2017).
Next year’s Survey should include a more complete discussion of these decisions.
77. 506 S.W.3d 607 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.).
78. See TAX §§ 41.43(b)(3), 42.26(a)(3).
79. City of Austin, 506 S.W.3d at 611, 616 (citing TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1).
80. Id. at 615–16, 618. In addition to bringing suit against the appraisal district, the
City also named as parties the thousands of property owners implicated by its constitu-
tional challenges. Id. at 611.
81. See id. at 620.
82. Id. at 616.
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“charged with implementing” the statute, the provisions at issue in this
case merely provided a procedural mechanism for the appraisal process,
which is conducted by the appraisal district, not taxing units.83 The injury
alleged was therefore one that affected Austin property owners, not the
City of Austin.84
Another case involving Section 42.26(a)(3) of the Texas Tax Code is
Duke Realty Limited Partnership v. Harris County Appraisal District.85
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals’ decision demonstrates the
deference appellate courts often give to a trial court’s findings of facts
and credibility determinations. Duke Realty owned a parcel of land lo-
cated near a major intersection in Harris County. The company filed suit
challenging the appraisal district’s valuation of the property, alleging that
the appraisal was not equal and uniform as required by Section
42.26(a)(3) for tax years 2013 and 2014. The court of appeals explained
that, in determining whether property has been unequally appraised
under Section 42.26(a)(3), an expert typically “identifies a reasonable
number of comparable properties and then takes the appraised value of
those properties from the public record and appropriately adjusts them to
the subject property.”86
At trial, Duke Realty’s expert contended that properties of a similar
size should be used for comparison, while the appraisal district’s expert
concluded that properties of a similar location should be used. The court
of appeals held that “[t]he trial court, as factfinder, was entitled to make
credibility determinations and weigh the competing expert testimony and
the variables and assumptions upon which that testimony was based.”87
Because Duke Realty failed to demonstrate that the trial court was un-
reasonable in crediting the appraisal district expert’s testimony over that
of its own expert, its legal sufficiency challenge failed.88
In Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd. v. Willacy County Appraisal Dis-
trict,89 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals addressed whether Section
25.25(b) of the Texas Tax Code may be used to reapportion value in prop-
erty between two different taxpayers when such reapportionment will in-
crease one taxpayer’s liability. Section 25.25(b) provides that “[t]he chief
appraiser may change the appraisal roll at any time to correct . . . a deter-
mination of ownership . . . that does not increase the amount of tax liabil-
83. Id. at 616–17 (citing Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex. 1998)).
84. Id. at 617. For a discussion of the Austin Court of Appeals’ determination of a
procedural issue, see infra text accompanying note 120.
85. No. 14-15-00543-CV, 2016 WL 3574666, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
June 30, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
86. Id. (citing In re MHCB (USA) Leasing & Fin. Corp., No. 01-06-00075-CV, 2006
WL 1098922, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 27, 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem.
op.)).
87. Id. at *3 (citing Hedgepeth v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., No. 01-12-01156-
CV, 2013 WL 6097798, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 19, 2013, no pet.) (mem.
op.)).
88. Id. at *4.
89. 492 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, pet. filed).
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ity.”90 The appraisal district relied on that section to support its proposed
redistribution of the tax liability between the taxpayers, arguing that the
aggregate tax liability with respect to the property at issue was not being
increased.91 Sebastian Cotton, however, argued that liability in this sub-
section refers to any one taxpayer’s liability, not the net effect of a change
in ownership.92
In analyzing the dispute, the court of appeals discussed three themes
informing its interpretation of the Tax Code provision at issue: the Tax
Code “(1) consistently treats the term ‘liability’ as an individual rather
than net-effect concept, (2) grants a right of hearing to those facing tax
increases, and (3) favors finality after all hearings have been com-
pleted.”93 Because Section 25.25(b) used the term “liability,” did not
grant a right of hearing, and would have imposed post-appraisal changes
on taxpayers, the court of appeals concluded that the appraisal district
was not authorized to shift taxes between taxpayers as it had attempted
to do.94 The appellate court ruled in Sebastian Cotton’s favor, finding
that the district court erred in upholding the assessment against Sebastian
Cotton for the increase in liability.95
B. COMPTROLLER RULES
Although the Texas property tax is mostly administered at the local
level, the comptroller has some property tax functions, including duties
related to economic development agreements.96
During the Survey period, the comptroller adopted amendments to
90. Id. at 831 (emphasis omitted) (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(b) (West
2015)).
91. Id.
92. See id. Sebastian Cotton also argued that the appraisal district had failed to ex-
haust its administrative remedies with respect to a fraud claim because the appraisal dis-
trict did not raise that issue with the appraisal review board. Addressing this argument,
which has led to a split among appellate courts, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals con-
cluded that a failure to raise an issue before the appraisal review board does not deprive a
district court, which exercises de novo review, of jurisdiction over that issue. Id. at 829. But
see Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. ETC Mktg., Ltd., 399 S.W.3d 364, 369 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied); Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Plains Mktg., LP,
202 S.W.3d 469, 475–76 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied); Quorum Int’l v. Tarrant
Appraisal Dist., 114 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).
93. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, 492 S.W.3d at 835.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 836.
96. During the Survey period, the comptroller also adopted rules pertaining to local
government relief related to the disabled veterans property tax exemption. These rules
provide guidelines for local governments to follow in order to qualify for offsets to revenue
lost related to the exemption. See 434 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 9.4321, 9.4323, 9.4325, 9.4327
(2017) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Definitions (§ 9.4321); Application (§ 9.4323); Re-
view by Comptroller (§ 9.4325); Payment to Qualified Local Government (§ 9.4327)). The
comptroller also adopted appraisal guidelines for certain types of property, including air-
ports and recreational property, parks, and scenic land. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 9.4009
(2017) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Appraisal of Recreational, Park, and Scenic Land);
see also 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 9.4010 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Appraisal of Pub-
lic Access Airport Property).
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Rules 9.1052,97 9.1053,98 9.1054,99 and 9.1059100 of the Texas Administra-
tive Code, and adopted new Rule 9.1060 of the Texas Administrative
Code,101 all of which relate to economic development agreements under
Chapter 313 of the Texas Tax Code.102 Among other changes, the comp-
troller shortened the amount of time a school district has to review a
taxpayer’s economic development agreement application prior to its
meeting to discuss such application from thirty days to twenty days,103
and changed the location used to evaluate whether an application has met
the qualifying jobs requirements from the location of the school board’s
administrative office to the location of the job itself.104
IV. PROCEDURE
A. REPORTED CASES
While property tax cases still present the lion’s share of procedural is-
sues in any given survey period, several taxpayers struggled during this
Survey period with procedural issues in other tax contexts.
Brown v. Hegar105 involved a sales tax contest between a taxpayer and
the comptroller regarding whether the taxpayer’s purchase of an aircraft
qualified for the occasional sale exemption and whether the taxes as-
sessed against him were barred by the statute of limitations.106 Brown
purchased an aircraft from CMB Sales, Inc. in April 2003. Neither Brown
nor CMB paid any state taxes on the transaction, and only CMB filed a
sales tax return for the period in which the sale occurred. Three months
after the general four-year statute of limitations would have expired with
respect to the transaction, the comptroller assessed tax and penalty on
Brown. Brown argued that the statute of limitations—which normally
does not begin to run with respect to periods for which the taxpayer did
not file a required return—should nevertheless apply to the transaction at
issue in his case because CMB had filed a tax return with respect to that
period.107 The comptroller contended that Brown was required to file a
tax report himself because he owed use tax on the item, that he had failed
to file a required return, and that the four-year statute of limitations did
97. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 9.1052 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Forms).
98. Id. § 9.1053 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Entity Requesting Agreement to
Limit Appraised Value).
99. Id. § 9.1054 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, School District Application Review
and Agreement to Limit Appraised Value).
100. Id. § 9.1059 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Annual Compliance Review for Qual-
ifying Jobs and Penalties).
101. Id. § 9.1060 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Agreement for Limitation on Ap-
praised Value).
102. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 9.1051–9.1054, 9.1059, 9.1060 (2017).
103. See id. § 9.1053(f).
104. See id. § 9.1059(c).
105. No. 03-14-00492-CV, 2015 WL 7952259 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 3, 2015, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
106. See id. at *2.
107. See id. (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.205(a)(2) (West 2015)).
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not apply.108
The Austin Court of Appeals rejected Brown’s argument as a general
matter, noting that
it seems reasonable to conclude that the legislature did not intend for
the statute of limitations to bar recovery when a report is filed by
someone other than the person who allegedly owes the taxes at issue,
particularly in the circumstances present in this case where the filed
report does not accurately reflect that a taxable transaction
occurred.109
Further, the court of appeals noted that recognizing such a construction
of the statute might enable tax evasion by allowing less scrupulous tax-
payers to “avoid liability by having the other party to the transaction start
the running of the limitations period by filing a tax report for the applica-
ble period of time and deliberately conceal that a taxable event oc-
curred.”110 However, the court of appeals was not able to determine
whether Brown was required to file the underlying use tax return because
a fact question remained as to whether the transaction had occurred in
Texas or Alabama.111 According to the comptroller, if the sale occurred
in Alabama, Brown would have owed use tax, instead of sales tax, on the
aircraft and would have been required to file a return.112
In Anheuser-Busch, L.L.C., v. Harris County Tax Assessor-Collector,113
the Harris County Tax Assessor-Collector failed to send a tax bill to both
Anheuser-Busch and its authorized agent for property taxes on seven of
its factories located in the county.114 Anheuser-Busch paid its taxes late
with respect to those properties and incurred statutory penalties and in-
terest for which it requested a waiver. The tax assessor countered that it
had substantially complied with its statutory notice obligations and that
penalty and interest waiver was therefore inappropriate.115
Contrary to the tax assessor’s assertion, the First Houston Court of Ap-
peals concluded that Section 31.01 of the Texas Tax Code contains an
unambiguous requirement that both the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s
agent be notified of taxes assessed against the taxpayer; allowing other-
wise would “rewrite the statute.”116 For five of the seven properties at
issue, the appellate court ordered a full refund of penalties and interest
for the tax assessor’s failure to comply with Section 31.01(a).117 For the
other two properties, a fact question remained as to whether Anheuser-
108. Id.
109. Id. at *5.
110. Id. at *6.
111. Id. at *6–7.
112. Id. at *6.
113. 516 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. filed).
114. Id. at 4.
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id. at 10 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 31.01(a) (West 2015)). In 2005, the legisla-
ture amended Section 31.01(a), which had required that the bill be mailed to the person
listed on the tax roll “or the person’s authorized agent.” Id. at 8.
117. Id. at 13.
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Busch had validly appointed an authorized agent, so the court of appeals
remanded for a further determination on that issue.118
In addition to the underlying substantive dispute, the City of Austin
case (discussed above)119 also involved an interesting procedural issue.120
Rather than present a full case on the merits before the appraisal review
board, the City of Austin (the City) and the appraisal district submitted
an agreed motion at the administrative level simply identifying its chal-
lenge and requesting that the appraisal review board deny the challenge
so the City could proceed to district court. The Austin Court of Appeals
granted the appraisal district’s plea to the jurisdiction, concluding that, by
merely going through the motions of appealing to the appraisal review
board, the City had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies re-
quired by the Texas Tax Code.121 According to the court of appeals, “the
City decided to effectively forego the administrative determination of its
challenge, depriving the district court of jurisdiction.”122
Property tax accounts and the division of property among accounts
continued to be a source of litigation during the Survey period.123 In
Tomball Independent School District v. Mustang Machinery Company,
Ltd.,124 the First Houston Court of Appeals addressed whether a prop-
erty owner owes penalties and interest when it requests that certain prop-
erty be moved from one account to another.125 Mustang had two
accounts with the Harris County Appraisal District—one for business
property and one for inventory. Mustang filed a motion to correct the tax
rolls under Section 25.25 of the Texas Tax Code, asking that $1.7 million
worth of property be transferred from the business property account to
the inventory account.126 After the correction was made, Tomball ISD
billed Mustang for additional taxes, penalty, and interest.127 In imposing
penalty and interest despite the fact that Mustang had timely paid before
the correction, Tomball ISD argued that “if a correction motion increases
the amount due on an account, penalties and interest on the entire
amount contained in the correction motion begin to accrue from the orig-
inal delinquency date.”128 Mustang countered that the Tax Code “focuses
on whether the taxpayer paid the tax on the property underlying the dis-
pute” and that it therefore owed no additional tax on the property on
118. Id.
119. See discussion supra Section III.A.
120. See City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d 607, 617–20 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2016, no pet.).
121. See id. at 620.
122. Id.
123. Another case involving the effect of property tax accounts on a property owner’s
substantive rights is Galveston Central Appraisal District v. Valero Refining–Texas L.P. See
discussion supra note 77. For a discussion of the Valero court of appeals decision, see
Ohlenforst et al., supra note 3, at 502–03.
124. 497 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
125. See id. at 132.
126. Id. at 132–33 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(c) (West 2015)).
127. Id. at 133.
128. Id. at 135.
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which it had already paid taxes prior to the correction.129
The court of appeals agreed with Mustang, holding that “[b]ecause
Mustang paid taxes on the original appraisal amount of the underlying
property and the statute focuses on the payment of taxes for property,
not for an account, it does not owe penalty and interest on the originally
assessed value of the transferred property.”130
V. OTHER SIGNIFICANT APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS
In Morath v. The Texas Taxpayer and Student Fairness Coalition,131 a
significant decision that surprised many, the Texas Supreme Court de-
cided a broad challenge to the constitutionality of the Texas public school
finance system without finding the system unconstitutional.132 More than
half of the state’s public school districts “brought the most far-reaching
funding challenge in Texas history.”133 The supreme court noted that
“Texas’s more than five million school children deserve better than serial
litigation over an increasingly Daedalean ‘system.’ They deserve trans-
formational, top-to-bottom reforms.”134 However, within its limited judi-
cial role, the supreme court deferred to the legislature.135 “Lawmakers
decide if laws pass, and judges decide if those laws pass muster. But our
lenient standard of review in this policy-laden area counsels modesty. The
judicial role is not to second-guess whether our system is optimal, but
whether it is constitutional.”136 In a lengthy opinion, the supreme court
ultimately determined that “[d]espite the imperfections of the current
school funding regime, it meets minimum constitutional
requirements.”137
In Hegar v. Texas Small Tobacco Coalition,138 the Texas Supreme
Court addressed another constitutional issue: whether a “fee” imposed
on cigarettes and tobacco products under the Health and Safety Code
violates the Texas Constitution’s equal and Uniform Clause. In 2013, the
Texas legislature enacted a fee on tobacco products that applied only to
tobacco companies that had not signed settlement agreements with the
state relating to claims for antitrust violations and deceptive advertis-
ing.139 Texas Small Tobacco Coalition (Small Tobacco) argued that the
fee was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal and Uniform
Clause of the Texas Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.140 The trial court held that the
129. Id.
130. Id. at 136.
131. 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2016).
132. See id. at 886.
133. Id. at 833.
134. Id. at 833–34.
135. Id. at 833, 886.
136. Id. at 886.
137. Id. at 833.
138. 496 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. 2016).
139. Id. at 780.
140. Id. at 784.
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subchapter imposing the fee was unconstitutional under both constitu-
tions, and the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed, but only on the basis of
Small Tobacco’s challenge under the Equal and Uniform Clause of the
Texas Constitution.141 Analyzing the reasonableness of the tax’s subject
matter classification, the court of appeals held that, although the pur-
poses of the tax were laudable, “imposing a tax on only one class of iden-
tical products is not equal and uniform” where the only justification for
the classification was whether a taxpayer had earlier entered into a settle-
ment agreement with the state.142
In reversing the court of appeals’ decision, the supreme court observed
that the equal-and-uniform analysis focuses on the taxpayer at issue, not
on the taxpayer’s products, and as such, affords the legislature broad dis-
cretion in classifying taxpayers.143 “Products do not pay taxes; taxpayers
do. For that reason, in the non-property context, the nature of the tax-
payer necessarily lies at the heart of any Equal and Uniform Clause in-
quiry.”144 The supreme court then determined that the classification
between Small Tobacco and the tobacco companies that settled with the
state was rational.145 Under that standard, there were “sufficient differ-
ences in business operations to justify the non-settling-manufacturer and
settling-manufacturer tax classifications.”146 The supreme court noted
that the settling manufacturers, pursuant to their settlement, had to pay
the state $500 million per year and were restricted from challenging cer-
tain legislative initiatives, and the supreme court concluded that the clas-
sification was reasonably related to the legislative “goals of recovering
health care costs and reducing underage smoking.”147
VI. CONCLUSION
Against the backdrop of the 2016 national political contests, Texas
politics and law during the Survey period seemed more civilized but that
civility would be put to the test at various times during the 2017 Texas
legislative session. Although issues other than tax generally dominated
the regular legislative session, several significant tax-related bills made
their way to the governor’s desk, while others were unable to attract the
support needed—either in the legislature or from the governor—to be-
come law. Despite the Texas Supreme Court’s somewhat unexpected de-
141. Id.
142. Id. at 785. For a discussion of the court of appeals’ decision, see Ohlenforst et al.,
supra note 3, at 514.
143. Id. at 786 (citing TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Commc’n on State Emergency
Commc’ns, 397 S.W.3d 173, 181 (Tex. 2013); In re Nestle, 387 S.W.3d 610, 620 (Tex. 2012)
(orig. proceeding); Tex. Co. v. Stephens, 103 S.W. 481, 485 (Tex. 1907)). “The discretion
inherent in [the legislature’s] authority is hobbled by no substantial handicap other than
the overriding rule that any claimed difference be ‘real.’” Id. at 791 (citing Tex. Co., 103
S.W. at 485).
144. Id. at 786.
145. Id. at 792.
146. Id. at 787.
147. Id. at 787–88.
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cision in Morath v. Texas Taxpayer and Student Fairness Coalition,148
holding that the public education system is constitutional, legislators have
acknowledged the need for property tax reform, and the governor re-
quested that property tax reform be one of the key issues addressed in
the 2017 special legislative session. As this article went to press, it re-
mained unclear exactly what that reform would ultimately look like or
when Texans would see such reform.
The regular legislative session gave rise to a few changes to the sales
and franchise taxes, but most were rifle shots, addressing discrete issues
or clarifications. It therefore remains likely that the most important sales
and franchise tax changes (and perhaps property tax changes as well) will
result as taxpayers and the comptroller’s team continue to work—some-
times together and sometimes at the courthouse—to articulate the scope
of these taxes as well as the circumstances in which comptroller guidance
or budgetary financial results are relevant to the court’s consideration.
148. See supra Part V.
